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A Magnificent Gift; Jan Patocka and Vaclav Havel on the Dissident Sacrifice 
 
Introduction 
In considering the meaning of a dissident sacrifice, there is a tendency to associate the 
meaning of the act with how the public receives the sacrifice. For example, the self-
immolation of an individual, if it incites a riot, is remembered and praised; if it receives no 
public attention, then those who hear of it may say ‘what a waste’. How a public perceives a 
sacrifice is largely a matter of accident, there is no formula for inciting a revolution through a 
martyrdom, hence one might want to claim that the meaning of a dissident sacrifice is reliant 
on contingency. The tragic statistics on the website for the International Campaign for Tibet, 
where the names of over 140 individuals who have self-immolated as an act of resistance is 
testament to the contingency of the reception.1 This is clearly not very helpful for 
understanding the political significance of a sacrifice and so the concept opens for analysis. 
This paper attempts to explore the meaning of dissident sacrifice by unpacking the moral and 
political significance in two differing accounts of sacrifice – that of Jan Patočka and Vaclav 
Havel. Essentially this paper asks whether only certain kinds of people can be meaningful 
sacrifices, and if there are on what grounds do we expect them to make a sacrifice?  
Aristotle’s thoughts on magnificence are a worthwhile consideration to begin this 
exploration, as he argues that a person of high social standing and wealth has more to give 
than one who does not.2 Hence magnificence can only be expected by one who has a great 
deal to give. Transposing the argument to dissent we can ask, can one give more in dissent 
than another, due to their position or standing? To continue with the simile, the magnificent 
man is like an artist who acts in a way that is most fitting, that is they consider how the 
                                                          
1 International Campaign for Tibet, “Self immolations by Tibetans” September 4, 2015, 
http://www.savetibet.org/resources/fact-sheets/self-immolations-by-tibetans/ (accessed January 5 2016).  
2Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 65 
production of the most beauty can be achieved for the community rather than considering the 
cost of the production.3 The magnificent man spends large sums fittingly and liberally. For 
Aristotle the poor man cannot be magnificent because the poor man has no means with which 
to spend large sums.4 Interestingly, for Aristotle, the poor man who tries to act magnificently 
is a fool because he is acting beyond what can be expected of him.5 In the dissident sacrifice 
the expenditure is with one’s life. The dissident offers a gift of death to the community by 
placing themselves at risk through their actions. A dissident sacrifice is an attempt at bringing 
beauty or goodness to the community through an act of civil disobedience. This beauty is to 
come through spending one’s life fittingly. Hence the question, are all sacrifices equal? Also 
the additional question arises, can dissidence only be expected of certain people (from certain 
social positions), and if so are people who try to be dissidents who don’t have the high 
positions from which to give a sacrifice being silly – would they be better off not making a 
sacrifice? 
These questions can be well posed through a thought experiment. A person, living in 
totalitarian conditions with no public profile and relatively few friends, all of whom are also 
without public profile, writes a letter to the government outlining the problems that she has 
with the system. She is being existentially honest with herself in writing the letter, in that she 
is expressing sincere doubts about the lack of justice in the state. She sends copies of her 
letter to her friends and the foreign news. Not having a network of dissidents to distribute 
material through, many copies of her letter are intercepted by the censors and do not reach 
their intended audience. Her friends that do get the letter, immediately burn it sensing the 
potential danger in being associated with it. The woman is promptly removed from her home, 
placed in jail, and is disappeared. 
                                                          
3Ibid, 65. 
4Ibid 66 
5Ibid 
 In comparison, a film director living under the same totalitarian state makes a short film 
outlining the horrors of the system in which he (and the woman) live. The film is smuggled 
out of the country and receives a high degree of attention. At home the film is shown in 
underground cinemas to a community of dissidents who all agree that the film portrays their 
daily struggle well. Those dissidents who see it decide to make protest art of their own. The 
film maker is rounded up and disappears. People known to have watched it are disappeared as 
well and there is a lot of publicity around these arrests and disappearances.  
In both of these examples the protagonist makes a decision to act in an existentially honest 
way and stand up to an oppressive system. They make their challenge in what seems like the 
best way that they can. They both have one life to give and both risk it freely. Can we say that 
the film maker makes a more important sacrifice because his sacrifice is publicly received? 
To the extent that she can the woman is acting publicly. Her concerns are for the community; 
her intentions are the same as the film makers. Jan Patočka’s and Vaclav Havel’s respective 
writing on sacrifice seem to give us no good reason for judging the two examples differently 
in terms of the magnitude of their sacrifice. What separates the examples is the fittingness of 
their actions. I will argue that essentially the effect, or degree of publicity, are not in 
themselves criteria for judging a dissident sacrifice. In Patočka’s thought there is a heroic 
inflection to sacrifice which is lost in Havel’s writing. Sacrifice for Patočka is more about a 
rupture with the ordinary and everyday whereas for Havel sacrifice has a practical political 
element, which, although heavily coloured by Patočka’s thought is unique because of the 
focus on sacrifice’s political dimension.  
For both Patočka and Havel meaningful action begins in a phenomenological process. 
Reflection allows one to become ‘shaken’ in Patočka’s words, or, it allows one to realise 
one’s powerless power in Havel’s words. It can be said therefore that reflection allows one to 
consider what is most fitting for the community and to consider what is the best way to ‘care 
for one’s soul.’ It is in the varying understandings of reflection and the link between 
reflection and care for the soul that we can begin to use Patočka and Havel’s thought to make 
pronouncements on judging sacrifices. 
 
Patočka on care for the soul and reflection 
Caring for the soul is described by Patocka in Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of 
History. 
Care for the soul means that truth is something not given once and for all, nor 
merely a matter of observing and acknowledging the observed, but rather a 
lifelong inquiry, a self-controlling, self-unifying intellectual and vital practice.6 
 
For Patočka, caring for the soul is the process of philosophy that shows to the self how best to 
live, and also, in this reflection on living, how best to die – that is how to be-towards-death.7 
Patočka understands care in a Heideggerian way as the movement of existence in world of 
things and others.8 Care is also understood as acting towards the world. The most profound 
expression of care is care for ourselves - for our own being.9 Care for the soul (care for our 
own being) involves a phenomenological reduction to understand the context in which we are 
relating to the world and encountering the world.10 This reduction reveals to us the 
possibilities that are manifest in phenomena as they present to us. That is, through care for the 
soul we transcend appearance and become aware of the possibilities and transcendence 
                                                          
6 Jan Patočka, Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History, trans. Erazim Kohak (Chicago: Open Court 
Publishing) 82. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as HE. 
7See, Edward Findlay, Caring for the Soul in a Postmodern Age, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2002), 65-68. 
See also, Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, 2nd Ed, trans. David Wills (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1999), 12-13. 
8Jan Patočka Body CommunityLlanguage World, trans. Erazim Kohak, (Chicago: Open Court, 1998), 143 
9Ibid 164 
10Ibid 
inherent in every moment.11 Hence the phenomenological reduction, for Patočka does not 
reveal the thing in itself to us as it might in Husserl, rather this kind of reflection reveals the 
possibility of transcendence to an embodied and contextualised existent who is a being in 
motion, moving between possibilities.12 In other words care for the soul, for Patočka is taking 
responsibility for how we live in the world. 
Patočka describes human existence as three kinds of movement. These movements are 
mutually exclusive and simultaneous. That is all three movements occur in the human being 
at once. The first movement is the movement of sinking roots, what Patočka calls 
anchoring.13 This is a movement of finding oneself in the world instinctively. It is a 
movement associated with discovering our corporeality and finding a harmonious place in the 
world amongst things of which we ourselves are also a thing. The second movement is that of 
self-sustenance and self-projection.14  This is the movement of human work - of coming to 
terms with the world through work. That is through using the things in the world. This is the 
world of meaning in which we extend our existence from our body into things.15 The third 
movement is the movement of existence which looks to make a global closure on the first two 
movements.16 It is the “movement of existence in the true sense.”17 What Patočka means is 
that the third movement grasps the other two movements in a movement of reflection. In the 
reflection of the third movement all that is neglected in the other two movements is revealed. 
The self asks, ‘what am I not doing?’ The existent comes to terms with existence and this 
coming to terms is the movement of existence. The presentation of Being as a question and 
the integration of all spheres of human meaning into an accounting for that question. 
                                                          
11Ibid 165 
12Ibid 165-166 
13Ibid 148. 
14Ibid. 
15Ibid 150 
16Ibid 148. 
17Ibid 151. 
The nature of humanity can be found in the third movement, in the self’s accounting for 
itself. Hence a life without reflection is a life that is less than fully human. The third 
movement allows human to come to terms with their finitude and hence overcome the 
particularity of life and understand life as a whole. This third movement puts us into conflict 
with ideological abstractions which pervade the political spheres in which we live by 
showing them how they fail to grasp the whole which they claim to lay hand to.18 In other 
words, it is through conflict introduced through reflection that the individual sees their life 
not as a particular life but a true, embedded and engaged life. 
Thus at the centre of our world the point is to reach from a merely given life to 
the emergence of a true life, and that is achieved in the movement that shakes the 
objective rootedness and alienation in a role, in objectification...19 
 
For Patočka, the third movement “shakes” all of the roles that we occupy in our everyday life 
through our confrontation with finitude. When shaken, one sees life as a whole and hence one 
is aware of responsibility as one is aware of the extent that one impacts on others in the 
greater scheme of things. 
The idea of the shaken is a key concept in Patočka's Heretical Essays. Patočka argues that 
in the modern day the third movement has been quashed by the forces of history.20 The 
argument of the Heretical Essays is that history set up the conditions for caring for the soul 
until modernity, in turning the world into a calculable, measurable world of things (and only 
things) has lost the ability to transcend life in its particularity.21 In other words modernity has 
                                                          
18 Jan Patočka ‘The Dangers of Technization in Science according to E. Husserl and the Essence of Technology 
as Danger according to M. Heidegger’ in Jan Patočka; Philosophy and Selected Writing, Erazim Kohak ed. 
And trans. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989), 328-329 
19Jan Patočka 'The “Natural” World and Phenomenology' in Jan Patočka; Philosophy and Selected Writing, 
Erazim Kohak ed. And trans. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989), 263 
20 Patocka Heretical, 127. 
21 Patocka, ‘Dangers of Technicization’, 332. 
forgotten responsibility. This is a Heideggerian argument and Patočka is explicitly borrowing 
from Heidegger's critique of technology. For Patočka (and for Heidegger) the particular way 
we live today as beings that employ technology without a corresponding responsibility is 
problematic and even dangerous.22 The Heretical Essays argue that as a consequence of the 
wars of the twentieth century, history has transformed the world into a war for peace - a war 
where everyday citizens are used as combatants in a war of economics.23 Patočka argues that 
armies of businessmen and workers compete in a war for the things of the world. We have 
governments which guarantee peace and focus on growing economies so we can celebrate 
peace through consumption and the continuation of our roles as performers for an economy. 
Our actions are not responsible because largely we are living for this moment of peace than 
rather than for life as a whole, across time. We have fallen for the illusion that our abstracted 
ideas such as ‘progress’ and ‘enlightenment’ etc. are total explanations for the human 
predicament. These are in reality but masks that hide that the repeated attempt by humans 
who dare step outside of the over-determined historical world through rising out of fallenness 
through actions challenge our servitude to present technological world.24  
Recovering a community of the shaken is Patočka's answer to the responsibility-less 
world. The shaken are described by Patocka in reference to World War One combatants as 
who suspend their everyday lives whilst fighting at the front. At the front all of the interests 
that normally occupy a person disappear and one senses that the best thing to do is to fight for 
the destruction of a world which was horrible enough to place them at the front line in the 
first place.25 The desire for destruction turns into a realisation that one can transcend one’s 
situation by choosing to become a sacrifice. The soldier becomes a sacrifice for life itself 
when, free from ordinary everyday concerns, they fight at the front and decide to no longer be 
                                                          
22 Ibid, 328. 
23 Ibid, 328-329. 
24 Ibid, 335. 
25 Patocka, Heretical Essays, 126 
a coerced statistic –they can in stepping into the zone of risk that the front presents risk 
themselves for no other reason than life. The meaning of their sacrifice is found in the 
irreducibility of their actions to calculable usable resources.26 Their sacrifice points to “the 
persistent presence of something that does not appear in the calculations of the technological 
world.”27 The sacrifice is a radical turning away from the ordinary everydayness in order to 
add a richness to life, not any particular life but to the experience of life.28 Sacrifices can be 
repeated by others who share in the transformative power of sacrifice for refocusing man’s 
attention to truth. The shaken, in The Heretical Essays are those individuals who can in 
solidarity replicate the example of the soldier in turning away from everydayness to uncover 
“a new primordial truth.”29 The shaken bring the understanding of the significance of 
sacrifice for making explicit the relation between “the essential core of man and the finite 
ground of our understanding.30 
Avazier Tucker points out that for Patočka the dissident is like Socrates, acting as a 
combatant for truth in a society that is hostile to such conflict.31 The hostility arises because 
the third movement has been lost for the majority of that society who are immersed in the 
calculable roles society has set them. As in Plato’s cave allegory where the prisoners are 
hostile to the philosopher upon his return to the cave, the voice of the shaken can bring anger 
and resentment. Edward Findlay argues that for Patočka shaking one's roots is the prerogative 
of philosophy. Only a politics that incorporates philosophy is responsible.32 Findlay points 
out that for Patočka politics is philosophy in practice insofar as politics is the practice of life. 
                                                          
26 Patocka, ‘Dangers of Technicization’, 337. 
27 Ibid, 337. 
28 Ibid, 338-339. 
29 Ibid, 333. 
30 Ibid, 339. 
31Avazier Tucker, The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patočka to Havel, (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 30. 
32Findlay Caring, 108 
The dissident is hence a philosopher who can bring philosophy back into politics. In the 
Heretical Essays, Patočka writes that the solution to the problem of the twentieth century and 
the loss of the third movements is located in “the solidarity of the shaken.” This is a 
community of philosophers who can shake human beings into an awareness of the possibility 
of their own freedom.33  They are combatants against their own society. Sacrifice for Patočka 
is the act of a philosopher. That is only someone who sees the ordinary world as a problem 
and then reaches for a means to reject the forces of the present which seek to order and 
manage life can make a sacrifice for life. Patočka attributes greatness and nobility to the 
philosopher, not in wealth, but in what they can give the polis. Hence in its ability to promote 
a philosophical investigation into the heart of the question of being human, sacrifice can be 
great. The greatness is dependent upon the individual making the sacrifice in order to 
transcend everydayness. In this sense sacrifice seems an egalitarian concept as all one needs 
is the refelective capacity to see that life is more than the ordinary and everyday. One must 
first understand that life is finite, embrace this finitude and reject everyday concerns which 
encourage one to give in to a determined mode of life. In other words sacrifice, in order to be 
great, must aim at a great expression of life.  
In the terms of the two cases presented in the first section the argument could be made that 
both the housewife and the filmmaker fulfil this criteria. Both are risking something dear to 
them, their lives, and one can assume their motives are for sustaining their integrity, (they 
cannot remain silent any longer), and presumably, through their risky actions, their being is 
intensified, the content of their lives takes on a richer aspect and their confrontation with their 
own finitude enriches their being in so far as they feel that the loss of life is better than 
remaining in ideological chains. There is, in both cases, as far as the analysis thus far has 
proceeded, something of the philosopher in both cases.  
                                                          
33Findlay 141 
That for Patocka the true dissident is a philosopher is more explicit in Plato and Europe 
where Patočka discusses the return to the cave by the philosopher in Plato's cave allegory.  
Patočka writes that all philosophy takes place in Plato's cave.34 Philosophers are expected to 
exercise their duty and return to the cave “because something like human life, that is, life 
where care for the soul is possible, is only realisable under these conditions.”35  Patočka turns 
to Aristotle when he discusses the return to the cave because Aristotle helps Patočka 
philosophise in the cave. Whereas Plato directs the soul vertically, away from the appearance 
to the form, Aristotle, for Patočka, offers a horizontal thinking which analyses the movement 
of appearances which make a form of the appearance.36That is, Aristotle allows the third 
movement to grasp the other two movements in the cave as universally significant. For 
Aristotle, understanding is of the movement of existence, not a static form. Hence inside 
Plato's cave (in the world of appearance) Aristotle's philosophy represents an attempt at 
promoting the third movement of existence – the analysis of action. 
In Patočka’s philosophy, in taking account of a specific context (in the cave), it might be 
necessary that in caring for the soul one must risk oneself. One must become, or risk 
becoming a sacrifice. Eddo Evink describes Patočka’s thoughts on sacrifice.37 “Responsibility 
is always taken in a specific moment, for specific people, at a specific place, in a specific 
decision, for which a specific account can be given.”38 In other words the philosopher, upon 
reflection on responsibility, takes account of their action and in this taking account bestows 
meaning on the sacrifice. This is not a responsibility to a universal form of justice, but a 
                                                          
34Jan Patočka, Plato and Europe, trans. Petr Lom (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 189. 
35Ibid. 
36Ibid, 191. 
37 Eddo Evink “Patočka and Derrida on Responsibility” in A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana 
LXXXIX, (Houten: Springer 2006), 307-321. 
38 Ibid 319. 
taking account, inside the cave, to a specific time, place and context.39 Hence the dissident 
chooses to die rather than accepting an appearance of life as a life of things. There is a natural 
human dignity in being-towards-death that the dissident embodies in their sacrifice.40  
Reflection (taking account of one’s situation and context), inside the cave, which grasps 
appearances and offers transcendence of particulars, requires a community of philosophers. 
Patočka writes that sacrifice “might lead to a transformation in the way we understand both 
life and the world”.41 In order to change humanity’s understanding of life there needs to be 
free thinkers who interpret the act of the sacrifice, they do not determine the meaning of the 
sacrifice but instead understand the rupture with the ordinary that the sacrifice makes. Hence 
it is important that the shaken are shaken in solidarity (as a community). This throws a 
negative light on the sacrifice of the housewife from the earlier thought experiment. 
When describing the sacrifice of the shaken Patočka employs the language of heroism. In 
describing the act where the shaken individual risks themselves Patočka uses the term 
aristeia.42 The aristeia is the moment when the hero acts heroically, for example when 
Achilles routs the Trojan army. For Patočka the aristeia is available only to a few “who are 
capable of becoming gods”.43 We can turn to an earlier essay of Patočka’s for a clue to what 
he means with this heroic language. In an earlier essay Patočka claimed that sacrifice could 
only be made by a person who understands that risk opens one up to the richness of life lived 
for more than technological life presents as. He writes, 
And he who takes on this path gives to others not simply something that can be placed 
“on order,”… but rather… this glimpse of a reversal, a new primordial truth.”44  
                                                          
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Patocka, “Dangers of Technicization”, 339. 
42 Evink, 319. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Patocka, “Dangers of Technicization”, 332. 
Thus the need for a community for whom the sacrifice is a gift, and the heroic integrity to 
risk all are the conditions for Patočka of making a sacrifice. Evink’s list of meaningful risky 
dissenters include: Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Andrey Sakharov and Patočka himself – they are 
all public intellectuals with an audience.45 Avazier Tucker compares Patočka’s death to 
Socrates and claims that Patočka left behind a story which would win him immortal fame.46 
Tucker claims that Patočka makes a hero out of himself in risking his life with the Charter 77 
movement.47  
So in turning our attention to the two cases which began this paper we can ask if about 
their sacrifices. That each one has satisfied some of the conditions for having a meaningful 
sacrifice by Patočka’s standards can’t be denied. Both have found something wrong with the 
way that their lives were being determined by a dangerous system and chose to do more than 
simply live in the determined rules. Their risk is admirable and important. However it does 
seem that sacrifice requires a public who appreciate what the sacrificial victim has given in 
order for it to be truly meaningful. That is if the sacrificial victim is not noticed, does the 
significance of the sacrificial act really help to unlock our ground of understanding so that we 
may have a closer relation to truth? The answer colours our interpretation of the sacrifice of 
the housewife. That an admirable strength of character has been displayed by the unknown 
victim is worth noting, as is the probability that her actions were born of a realisation that life 
should be more than what was offered; however, if sacrifice is to be a practice of philosophy 
then I would assume that the sacrifice needs to connect to the lives of others in order to 
meaningfully participate in the uncovering of our relation to the world. In other words the 
realisation alone is not enough.  
                                                          
45 Evink, 319. 
46 Tucker,  Philosophy, 87. 
47 Ibid. 
In order to hone down our answer to the question of whether the public reception of a 
sacrifice is a meaningful lens to understand a sacrifice the next section will explore the 
approach to sacrifice of Vaclav Havel.  
 
Vaclav Havel and the Power of the Powerless 
 
 
Havel produced no systematic philosophy; however, his plays, open letters, essays, books 
and presidential diaries, although varied in medium do express a coherent set of ideas. One 
such idea that permeates his oeuvre is that sacrifice is made for personal reasons of 
conscience and always with a mind to addressing a particular political issue.48 Karel Kosik 
criticised Havel for muddying Patocka’s thought by losing the focus on the significane of 
acting for truth.49 Kosik contends that Havel’s focus on concrete political issues loses the 
philosophical significance of Patocka’s recovery of the ground of human understanding. 
Havel would, I contend have no problem with such allegations. His thought is not an attempt 
to reciver the essential ground of understanding from the dangers of technological thinking. 
Instead, for Havel, that technological thinking has promoted instrumental ways of relating to 
the world has produced detrimental political effects.50 In one of his first public addresses as 
president Havel points out the architectural waste land of Bratislava that he saw from an 
airplane window.51 He lambastes the previous socialist government claiming that they must 
not have wanted to look out their windows. For Havel, the glance out the window “enabled 
                                                          
48 Michael Zantovsky, Havel; A Life, (New York: Atlantic Books, 2014), 3. 
49 Karel Kosik, “The third Munich” trans. Miloslav Bednar in  Telos: A Quarterly Journal of Critical Thought. 
No. 94 (Winter 1993-1994): 152-154. 
50 Start of Summer Meditations. 
51 Vaclav Havel, “New Year’s Address to the Nation” trans. Paul Wilson in The Art of the Impossible, (New 
York: Alfred A Knopf Inc, 1994), 3-4. 
[him] to understand faster and better the situation into which we had gotten ourselves.”52 This 
anecdote is telling for getting a grip on Havel’s thought. Havel’s is a thinker whose thought is 
a lived attempt to change what he sees out of the window. His sense of conscience which led 
him to take great risks came from a sense that specific problems could be fixed.  
Havel’s play Protest, contains an argument about the meaning of a sacrifice and who can 
be expected to give one. Written in 1979 Protest is a one act play with two characters, Vanek 
and Stanek.53 It is a part of a trilogy of one act plays called the Vanek plays in which the 
somewhat autobiographical Vanek talks through moral issues of dissidence. The play begins 
with Vanek, who has just been released from jail, visiting his brother Stanek in order to obtain 
his signature on a letter which calls for the release of a pop-musician who has been 
imprisoned. Stanek is unaware of his friends reason for visiting and is attempting to get 
Vanek to write a letter to get the same musician released (Stanek’s daughter is pregnant to this 
musician). The entirety of the play involves a subtle but complex discourse between the two 
on the nature of dissent and dissent’s relationship to ethical meaningful action. James 
Pontusso claims that the play represents Havel’s attempt to lay a foundation for morality.54 
For Pontusso, as the play develops and Stanek backs away from signing the document, the 
audience’s recognition of the absence of morality from Stanek’s action reveals the presence 
of morality to the audience.55 This is not my reading. It is not clear that Stanek is entirely 
immoral. Stanek does not want to sign as he is frightened at the prospect of risking his good 
standing in society; however Stanek also offers some criticism on the expectation that 
dissidents make the risks. It is improper according to Stanek, to always expect a community 
                                                          
52 Ibid, 4. 
53 Vaclav Havel “Protest” in The Garden Party and Other Plays, trans. Vera Blackwell (New York: Grove Press, 
1993), 239-266. 
54 James Pontusso, Vaclav Havel; Civic Responsibility in a Postmodern Age (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2004), 90. 
55 Ibid, 91. 
of dissidents to make sacrifices of themselves. It is more the point that their conversation 
make the value of sacrifice ambiguous. 
The argument between them is quite important in understanding Havel’s thoughts on 
sacrifice and dissent. At the beginning of the play Stanek makes a comment about the terrible 
state of politics. Vanek responds that things are not so bad to which Stanek has a cutting 
retort. 
Stanek: Forgive me, Ferdinand, but you don’t happen to live in a normal 
environment. All you know are people who manage to resist this rot. You just 
keep on supporting and encouraging each other. You’ve no idea of the sort of 
environment I’ve got to put up with! You’re lucky you no longer have anything to 
do with it. Makes you sick at your stomach.56 
 
There is a pause following this pointed suggestion that the dissident is not a part of the 
normal community. Vanek offers a way out to his brother by suggesting that this other 
environment is the television industry in which Stanek works to which Stanek agrees. 
Stanek’s answer is suspicious. It does appear that he is making a point that dissidents have 
their world and everyone else has theirs – nothing to do his work in the television. If we 
import Patocka’ thoughts on the shaken into this analysis of the play we see that the idea that 
the dissident lives in another world to the citizen has traction. The shaken are by their very 
nature free from ordinary everyday concerns because of their risky behaviour. What is 
interesting in Protest is that a community of shaken might not be that helpful in achieving the 
political goals that may sacrifices aim at. There is a sense in Protest that things are not good 
because of the gap between the world of the dissidents and the world of the everyday.  
                                                          
56 Havel “Powerless,” 245. 
Vanek is doing visiting rounds to various members of the community to have the 
document signed. It is clear from the outset that Stanek is not going to be one of the 
signatories. However, he waxes lyrical about how signing would make him free. He claims 
that if he signed he could face his daughter and her partner with equanimity, and more 
importantly live with his conscience which screams at him to sign. He would lose his job, but 
he doesn’t like it anyway, and so that might be a good thing. In the end, what convinces 
Stanek not to sign is his realisation that signing would not make a political change. In 
considering what impact his signature on the document would have on those who are 
accommodating the regime, Stanek comes to the conclusion that his dissent would not shake 
anyone.57 In an ironic twist at the end of the play Stanek receives a phone call announcing 
that the musician has been released. Vanek claims that all is well and that it is a good thing he 
didn’t upset the regime by publishing the letter.  
In unpacking this series of events what is significant is that Vanek remains constant. 
Stanek, although never convincing in his intention to sign the document, oscillates between 
holding the view that dissent is a good thing to dissent being a bad thing. Stanek is wary of 
society’s expectation that dissidents carry the burden of challenging the system and he is 
wary of the dissident’s ability to actually make a difference. Vanek’s consistency is in conflict 
with Stanek’s variableness. However, rather than pointing to an essential ground of morality 
in the stability of Vanek, I find a reluctance in the play to judge Stanek for his refusal to sign. 
The attack on the ordinary everyday world that the dissident is supposed to embody is 
missing from Protest. Both Vanek and Stanek are considering signing in order to free a pop-
musician from prison. Vanek must sign as a matter of conscience and Stanek convinces his 
conscience that to act would not have effect and therefore his conscience does not demand a 
signature. Perhaps Havel is arguing that grand sacrificial gestures are meaningful when a 
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public profile allows them to have a great public meaning? There is some truth to this but it is 
better to see in Stanek’s refusal, Havel’s own optimism in hoping that humanity’s natural 
goodness can prevail over ideological modes of thinking. 
Havel repeatedly claims to suffer from optimism in that he believes most people to be 
naturally good.  Of course he hopes for the Stanek’s of this world to take a stand but he does 
not judge them for not taking one. That the individual must take account of themselves, to 
themselves is clearly an idea that Havel has developed from Patočka. In Havel, however, the 
explicit political nature of the moral call for sacrifice imparts an egalitarian inflection to the 
idea. Taking account of oneself is not a task strictly for philosophy; it is a task for everyone in 
any situation. If there is a judgement of Stanek located in the tone of the play it is in the 
pronouncement that change would only be possible if everyone behaved as the dissident does. 
Stanek suggests that dissidents, in taking on the preservation of morality in society as their 
task have set themselves a monumental, superhuman task.58 Vanek responds that rather than 
holding the nation’s morality in their hands that Vanek is relying on the natural goodness of 
people. This self-professed naivety of Havel’s is less naive the it appears at first glance. 
Protest is not a play about Vanek’s sacrifice it is about Vanek initiating a discussion about 
what it would take to improve things.  
In Summer Meditations, the first work published by Havel after he took on the role of 
President, Havel finds political hope in appealing to the natural goodness in the Czech 
population. He calls it a slumbering potential and writes that politicians have a duty to 
awaken it.59 There is little to be gained in demanding sacrifice of those who can’t find the 
fortitude to give one. There is also little to be gained in demonising those people as well. An 
interesting example from Czech history loosely involving Havel will make this point clearer. 
After the formation of the Charter 77 dissident movement which gathered signatures to 
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demand that the socialist government respect various human rights treaties it had signed up 
to, the government responded with a public show of other artists who were herded on to a 
stage and asked to sign a document that supported the current regime.60 Of course many 
signed and many did not. Havel’s biographer Michael Zantovsky argues that not signing did 
not require the greatest strength of moral fibre, yet I’m not sure that Havel would agree with 
him. The incident brings out a real case of Vanek and Stanek’s predicament. Vanek appeals to 
the moral goodness of Stanek who, like the artists who signed the counter Charter 77 
document.  Yet the decision to not sign is a big one. As an artist, the fact that one might not be 
able to make art anymore as a consequence of not signing is a grave prospect. Especially if 
signing the document would have no real impact as it was, by Zantovsky’s account, an 
obviously staged signing. Protest allows for caution and encourages a dialogue with 
conscience but not a call for sacrifice. If Stanek had decided that he must sign then that was a 
decision for Stanek. By shifting the focus on sacrifice from dissidents in a philosophical 
search for a richer experience of being to ordinary people pondering on the impact of politics 
on their ordinary everyday life, Havel moves the discussion to an interesting point. Sacrifice 
is not called for; however if one feels that sacrifice is necessary for one’s peace of mind then 
sacrifice is an important gift for attempting political change.  
In his famous and influential essay ‘The Power of the Powerless’ Havel writes 
allegorically of a greengrocer who is compelled by fear to place a communist slogan in his 
window.61 Havel employs some thought experiments to tease out what options the 
greengrocer has. He could continue to place the placard in the window which is a small 
behaviour, amongst other similar behaviours which reinforce the power of the ruling 
ideology. This option would allow him to live his life in relative comfort. On the other hand 
he could refuse to place the placard, which really has nothing to do with his job as a 
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greengrocer, and upset the system in a small way. This option would bring him into conflict 
with the regime and would carry some consequences; however for Havel, the greengrocer 
would be living in truth - living ‘as if’ the regime had no hold over him. Similarities to 
Patocka’s ideas of dissent are apparent. Both think that the best life is a life that risks its 
comfort for existential honesty. However in Havel the focus is on these small cases of dissent. 
The ideology is maintained through small actions and it is brought down by these small 
actions. Havel is not classifying dissidents as being in a similar set to world war one front line 
soldiers. Havel instead appeals to small bursts of displays of humanity wherever politics 
over-determines ones identity.  
It is significant that the subject of Havel’s thinking on dissent is a greengrocer. The 
greengrocer is not a philosopher, is not familiar with phenomenology, does not reflect in the 
manner prescribed by Patocka and yet still meaningfully dissents in becoming a sacrifice. 
Havel’s oeuvre is an attempt to explain his ideas to everyone. There seems to be a trust in 
Havel that every person is capable of a life in truth. Havel clearly hasn’t abandoned all of the 
language of his phenomenological forebears; but it is undeniable that in Havel’s work the 
concern is less with the specific epistemological details of reflection and more with 
encouraging individual reflection en masse. This is the strength of Havel’s writing according 
to Tony Judt. In Judt’s book Thinking the Twentieth Century, he makes the point that Havel is 
effective as a writer for dissidents precisely because of the accessibility of his language and 
examples.62 For Judt, what Havel achieves in dropping the rigor of phenomenological 
language but adapting key concepts such as ‘authenticity’ to his more generally readable 
writing style is a compelling example that can be understood in the west and locally.63 The 
importance of the greengrocer allegory, for Judt is the message that for all local citizens, 
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“their actions, however isolated, are not without meaning.”64 The meaning is not a heroic 
meaning as it is in Patocka. Instead, for Havel, the small contributions that each individual 
makes for their own conscience are significant in themselves. 
A better way of conceiving the dissident sacrifice in Havel is rather as a search for 
integrity than for truth. Havel does not see dissent as being the particular gift of the 
philosopher; it is a task for everyone in their private search for a clear conscience. Reflection 
is not the rigorous philosophical tool that it is in Patocka’s thought; rather reflection shows 
the individual how best to serve their integrity. In his last major work, To the Castle and 
Back, Havel writes that his entire mental life seems to him to have been an incessant 
engagement with a fear of his place in the order of things.65 His conscience tormented him, 
he asks himself continually was the right thing to do, and what has my action achieved? 
Havel embodies Patočka’s third movement described above. Yet this third movement 
explicitly relishes its ordinary everyday situation. This is not a debasement of Patocka’s 
thought as some critics have argued.66 There is richness to Havel’s more egalitarian 
conception of sacrifice which is not counter to Patočka’s but can stand as an expansion on 
Patočka’s thinking. Havel finds importance in the sacrifice and then expands to include prise 
for the small acts which can follow a sacrifice and which change the political behaviour of 
people. 
In ‘The Power of the Powerless’ Havel argues that a living in truth does not only require 
‘dissident’ actions. Instead a life in truth covers a whole host of more modest and mostly 
anonymous actions which might not have any political impact.67 Political impact, for Havel, 
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happens usually as a kind of accident where one has the fortune to be in a circumstance 
where one’s actions have reaching repercussions that are obvious.68 The importance of these 
modest actions, or actions which go unnoticed is that they allow a richness to enter what 
Havel calls the “independent life of society.”69 The independent life of society is a somewhat 
liberal understanding of society which includes self-education, creative activity and 
meaningful discourse. Havel explains himself using a metaphor of an ice-berg. He argues that 
acts of dissent, the visible and public acts are the small visible tip of the ice-berg that is 
supported by the more modest and probably private acts in that society. Without a rich 
independent life of society the heroic acts are impossible.70 That is, without teachers having 
private discussions with students about unofficial politics, or without professors giving illegal 
lectures in basements, or without an official looking the other way when it would be right to 
look away, without these actions and others of their kind major acts of dissent have no 
meaningful ground from which to sprout.  
It is a liberal vision of individuals searching for a private integrity through small acts that 
upset the power of a ruling ideology. This focus is clear in Havel’s essay ‘Politics and 
Conscience.’71 In this essay Havel explains his ideas of non-political politics. This political 
theory is what Havel means by the small private actions which sustain the independent life of 
society. Such actions create a sense of the importance of truth and morality into politics.72 
This furnishes the ground for a removal of power from the ruling ideology. For Havel each 
individual can contribute what they can. Ideology is supported by the sum total of the small 
movements of every citizen; hence the ideology is brought down through the removal of 
those small acts of support. Public awareness of acts of dissent doesn’t enter into it, or if it 
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does it might serve as an example for others. For Havel the importance is on justifying one’s 
actions to oneself. Each person’s sacrifice is equal in the magnitude of importance. 
Tony Judt wrote quite an early piece on Eastern European dissent in which he describes 
Havel’s conception of non-political politics as aiming at a society in which the issue is not an 
absence of political ideas, but rather a political situation in which the system finds an outpost 
in which citizen as they behave somewhat mechanistically.73 In his words, “it is the people, 
not political programs, which need to be replenished.”74 Judt criticises dissident intellectuals 
who fall for the illusion that they are on a front line of combat by producing 200 samizdat 
articles that gain notoriety not for their literary merit but by the opposition to them from the 
government. In reality the underground academics had a handful of readers and no one else 
knew about them.75 The gulf that Stanek accuses Vanek of standing beyond is apparent in 
Judt’s criticism. In Havel’s understanding of dissent samizdat activities are important, but so 
is the refusal of a worker to conform.  
Havel has a tendency in his writing to be highly critical of himself. His writing is fused 
with self-deprecating anecdotes.  This is a deliberate attempt to take away any heroic gloss 
from his activities.  He writes at length about his fears, worries, moments of overwhelming 
guilt and even haemorrhoids. In his 2011 feature film, Leaving (Odcházení), the central 
character appears to be a warts and all satire of himself - a President at the end of his time of 
service, reluctant to leave the comfort of the cloister-like palace.76 The film is harsh to 
characters who offer a kind of worship to the aging President. This deliberate attempt by 
Havel to avoid any heroic connotations to his activity is a key component of his idea of 
sacrifice. There is little point making heroes of dissidents when small actions are as 
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politically significant as large, well-documented and discussed ones. The greengrocer loses as 
much as the famous dissident and contributes as much. 
 
Conclusion 
Re-write conclusion. 
 
The greengrocer in Havel’s analogy dissents best when he refuses to place a placard sent 
to him by the government. He is putting himself at great risk to do so.  There are of course 
many other ways that the greengrocer can risk himself. It is obvious that not all risky 
activities are appropriate. For example the greengrocer, if he has no experience making films, 
and no audience to show it to, probably should avoid making his stand against the regime 
through the production of a film. That is best left to filmmakers who are more likely to have 
some kind of traction through their work. Instead for Havel there is a real focus on avoiding 
the behaviours that one is being coerced to do. Behaviour that risks oneself without upsetting 
the wheels and cogs of the system one is fighting against is simply a silly sacrifice and 
definitely not a magnificent gift.  
 
What is important is that in dissent, the actions of all have equal significance insofar as the 
magnitude of the risk is the same for everyone. As long as actions which place a person in 
risk are appropriate, and I will leave that word in its vagueness as it is beyond the scope of 
my thought to prescribe what is appropriate, then the actions of all who upset the 
machinations of ideology, whether those actions go recognised or not , are of equal worth. 
The letter writer in our example perhaps did not make the best choice relative to their 
possibilities in making their sacrifice; however she could have made as magnificent an 
impact as the film maker did, even if she remained unrecognised for it.   
  
 
